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There is a fundamental tension in defamation law between pre-
serving free speech and protecting reputation.  Because rights and
freedoms are not absolute, courts must strike the proper balance
between them.  The purpose of this article is to: 1) describe how
Canadian courts balance freedom of expression against an individ-
ual’s right to protect his or her reputation; and 2) compare the
balance struck by courts under Canadian common law, Quebec civil
law, and American law.  We shall see that Canadian common law
has tended to favor the protection of reputation at the expense of
free speech, and that the American and Quebec laws of defamation
have adopted a balance more protective of freedom of expression.
Under the Canadian Constitution, the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Canadian Charter) provides that “[e]veryone has the
following fundamental freedoms: . . . freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other
media of communication . . . .”1  The protection afforded to free
speech under this provision, however, applies only to acts of Parlia-
ment, the Legislatures, and the federal and provincial govern-
ments.2  Nevertheless, in interpreting the common law, courts must
be guided by and comply with the values set out in the Canadian
Charter.3
In Quebec, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (Que-
bec Charter) also protects fundamental freedoms.4  It provides:
* Professor, Faculty of Law, Université Laval.
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Schedule B of the Canada
Act 1982, ch. 11 § 2(b) (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
2. Id. § 32.  Note that the Canadian Charter may be applied to statutes in the
field of private law because it applies to all legislative enactments.
3. See Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] S.C.R. 1130, 1132 (“The common law
must be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with Charter principles.”).
4. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., ch. C-12 (2002) [hereinafter
Quebec Charter].
33
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“[e]very person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, in-
cluding . . . freedom of opinion, freedom of expression . . . .“5  The
Quebec Charter has quasi-constitutional status in the sense that al-
though it may be amended by way of an ordinary statute passed by
the Legislature of Quebec, it renders constitutionally void any ac-
tion taken by Quebec public authorities that are inconsistent with
the rights and freedoms guaranteed therein.6  In addition, the pro-
tections of the Quebec Charter may be claimed by individuals in
private dealings, unlike the protections afforded by the Canadian
Charter, which apply only to public acts.
In Canada, how conflicts that arise between free expression
and reputation are resolved will vary significantly depending on
whether a party is challenging the constitutional validity of a public
act or claiming defamation in a private action against another
party.  In the case of private dealings, the resolution of the issue will
differ as well in Canadian common law as in Quebec civil law.
Part II of this article discusses the general framework for Cana-
dian constitutional analysis in determining the constitutionality of a
given law and discusses the inherent tension between freedom of
expression and protection of reputation.  Part III focuses on the
balance between freedom of expression and the right to the protec-
tion of one’s reputation in Canadian common law.  Part IV focuses
on the same balance of expression and reputation, but in the con-
text of Quebec civil law.  Occasionally, some comparisons with
American law will also be drawn.  Part V argues that the Canadian
common law of defamation has tended to favor the protection of
reputation at the expense of certain aspects of free speech, and that
the American and Quebec private laws of defamation have adopted
a balance more favorable to freedom of expression.  Finally, Part VI
concludes that at least in cases of political speech, the Canadian
common law should be as speech protective as either the Quebec
or American standards for defamation law.
5. Id. § 3.
6. HENRI BRUN & GUY TREMBLAY, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 912 (Yvon Blais ed.,
2002).
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II. THE CANADIAN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS AND THE TENSION BETWEEN FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND PROTECTION OF REPUTATION
When the constitutionality of a public act is challenged, Cana-
dian courts apply the same two-step legal analysis regardless of
whether the alleged victim claims entitlement to protection pursu-
ant to the Canadian or the Quebec Charter.  The first step is to
establish whether a Charter right has been breached by a state act.7
The second step focuses on the justification for the breach of the
Charter right and comes from section 1 of the Canadian Charter,8
which provides that the protected rights and freedoms can be lim-
ited if the limits are “prescribed by law,” “reasonable,” and “demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society.”9  The burden of
proof in the first step lies with the party challenging the constitu-
tionality of the law, and, in the second step, with the party seeking
to uphold the validity of the challenged law.10  Each of the follow-
ing requirements must be fulfilled in order for a breach to be con-
sidered “reasonable and demonstrably justified.”  First, the
objective of the challenged legislation must relate to concerns
which are “pressing and substantial in a free and democratic soci-
ety”; and second, the means chosen must be proportional to this
“pressing and substantial” need.  In determining proportionality,
three criteria must be met: 1) the means taken must be rationally
connected to the objective; 2) the means must also “impair as little
as possible” the right or freedom in question; and 3) there must be
a proportionality between the positive effects of the means used to
achieve the objective and the negative effects on the right or free-
7. See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec, [1989] S.C.R. 927, 967 (asking first whether a
Charter right has been breached by state regulations before considering whether the
breach is justified).
8. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 136-37 (“[Section 1] provides criteria of
justification for limits on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.”).
9. Canadian Charter, Part I of Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 § 1
(U.K.) (“[T]he rights and freedoms set out in [§1 are guaranteed and] subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”).
10. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. at 136-37. See RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995]
S.C.R. 199, 209-10 (analyzing the second step, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 1
of the Canadian Charter as involving a balancing act between the right breached and a
pressing and substantial public interest).
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dom.11  If every detail of this two-step analysis is satisfied, then the
public statute is deemed to pass constitutional muster as applied.12
The Canadian and the Quebec Charters both safeguard free-
dom of expression.13  The latter also expressly guarantees a person
“[the] right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour, and reputa-
tion.”14  Although it is not expressly referred to in the Canadian
Charter, the Canadian Supreme Court has stated that the right to
preserve one’s reputation is nevertheless entitled to constitutional
protection because it is closely connected to the notion of human
dignity.15
The issue of defamation calls for a balancing between freedom
of expression and the right to safeguard one’s reputation.16  Cana-
dian courts have acknowledged the importance of the latter:
Democracy has always recognized and cherished the fun-
damental importance of an individual.  That importance
must, in turn, be based upon the good repute of a person.
It is that good repute which enhances an individual’s
sense of worth and value.  False allegations can so very
quickly and completely destroy a good reputation.  A rep-
utation tarnished by libel can seldom regain its former
lustre.  A democratic society, therefore, has an interest in
ensuring that its members can enjoy and protect their
good reputation so long as it is merited.17
Hence, the right to reputation is part and parcel of the rights of
personhood, which each democratic society must protect if it is to
11. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. at 106; Dagenais v. Canadian Broad. Corp., [1994] S.C.R.
835, 839; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada, [1998] S.C.R. 877, 882-83.
12. Ford v. Quebec, [1988] S.C.R. 712, 769-70 (citing R. v. Edwards Books & Art
Ltd., [1986] S.C.R. 713, 768-69).
13. The Canadian Charter, Part I of Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11
§ 2(b) (U.K.) provides in part the following fundamental freedoms: “freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other me-
dia of communication . . . .”  The Quebec Charter, R.S.Q., ch. C-12, § 3 (2002) pro-
vides: “Every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom
of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, free-
dom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.”
14. Quebec Charter, R.S.Q., ch. C-12, § 4 (2002).
15. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1175 (“A good reputation is closely related to the
innate worthiness and dignity of the individual.”).
16. Id. at 1172.
17. Id. at 1175.
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be mindful of safeguarding the person and his or her inherent
dignity.
The Canadian courts have also long acknowledged the funda-
mental importance of freedom of expression in a democratic soci-
ety.18  In Canada, as in the United States, the theoretical
foundation for protecting freedom of expression is generally un-
derstood to be based on three fundamental premises: participation
in the political and social debate (democracy); the search for truth
(the marketplace of ideas); and self-fulfillment and individual au-
tonomy.19  In light of these rationales for protecting freedom of ex-
pression — particularly the self-fulfillment theory, which is capable
of accommodating all forms and contents of expression — the
courts have adopted a very broad definition of its scope that pro-
tects a variety of human actions intended to convey a message,20
ranging from advertising,21 hate promotion,22 pornography,23 and
defamatory statements.24  The content of all types of expression,
18. See, e.g., R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.R. 45, 70 (“Among the most fundamental
rights possessed by Canadians is freedom of expression.”); R. v. Guignard, [2002] S.C.R.
472, 482 (“Since the Charter came into force, it has on many occasions stressed the
societal importance of freedom of expression and the special place it occupies in Cana-
dian constitutional law.”).
19. See Ford, [1988] S.C.R. at 769-70; Irwin Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 932.
20. See Irwin Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 969.
21. See Ford, [1988] S.C.R. at 788-89 (finding that a law that required the sole use
of the French language for public signs, posters, and commercial advertising infringed
on freedom of expression); Irwin Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 969-71 (finding that prohibiting
commercial advertising directed at persons under the age of thirteen infringed on free-
dom of expression); R. v. Guignard, [2002] S.C.R. 472, 485 (finding that a law prohibit-
ing the erection of advertising signs outside of industrial zones infringed on freedom of
expression).
22. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697, 868 (stating that suppression of commu-
nications that willfully promoted hatred infringed on freedom of expression); Canada
v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.R. 892, 954 (finding that suppression of anti-Semitic speech in-
fringed on freedom of expression); Ross v. New Brunswick Sch. Dist. No. 15, [1996]
S.C.R. 825, 863-64 (finding that suppression of anti-Semitic speech by an off-duty public
school teacher infringed on freedom of expression).
23. See Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] S.C.R. 1120, 1198
(stating that the restriction of gay and lesbian literature infringed on freedom of ex-
pression); Sharpe, [2001] S.C.R. at 72 (“prohibiting the possession of child pornography
restricts the rights protected by s. 2(b) and the s. 7 liberty guarantee.”); R. v. Butler,
[1992] S.C.R. 452, 488-90 (finding that suppression of hardcore pornography infringed
on freedom of expression).
24. See R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.R. 439, 484 (finding that a criminal law statute that
punished defamatory statements infringed on freedom of expression).
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“however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream,”25 is
initially entitled to the protection of the Charters.
Although fundamental, freedom of expression is neverthe-
less not absolute.  Its exercise may be restricted by the rights
and freedoms of others — in particular, the interest in protect-
ing one’s reputation.  To strike the most appropriate balance
in these cases, the courts have adopted a contextual approach
that attempts to define the extent to which a particular exer-
cise of freedom of expression can be understood to further one
or more of its larger theoretical purposes.26  In other words,
even if all expressions which tend to convey a message were
to benefit from the Charters’ protection, restrictions on a type
of expression which stands further away from the core values
of freedom of expression would be easier to justify than limita-
tions on a type of expression lying at the core of these values.27
25. Irwin Toy, [1989] S.C.R. at 968.
26. See Rocket v. Collège Royal des Chirurgiens Dentistes de l’Ontario, [1990]
S.C.R. 232, 242 (“the value of the limitation and the value of free expression [are]
weighed in the context of the case.”); RJR-MacDonald Inc., [1995] S.C.R. at 205 (“Con-
text, deference and a flexible and realistic standard of proof are essential aspects of the
s. 1 analysis.”).
27. Canadian Broad. Corp., [1996] S.C.R. at 513 (“Where, on the other hand, the
expression in question lies far from the “centre core of the spirit” of s. 2(b), state action
restricting such expression is less difficult to justify.”).  For an example of the applica-
tion of the proportionality test in matters of defamation, see Lucas, [1998] S.C.R. 439.
In that case, the Supreme Court first ruled that the provisions of the Criminal Code
infringed the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by paragraph 2(b) of the Ca-
nadian Charter. Id. at 456.  The Court then held that this limitation on freedom of
expression was reasonable and justifiable, and hence proportional. Id. at 484-85.  The
Court stated that the offense was rationally connected to the legislative objective of
protecting the reputation of individuals, and that the requirement that the Crown es-
tablish beyond a reasonable doubt the intent to defame with knowingly false statements
satisfied the requirement of minimal impairment. Id. at 466-67.  The Court noted that
because “defamatory libel is far from and indeed inimical to the core values of freedom
of expression,” the beneficial effects which the provisions relating to defamatory libel
had on the goal of the protection of a person’s reputation outweighed their negative
effects on freedom of expression. Id. at 480.  The Supreme Court therefore confirmed
the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Criminal Code on the grounds that
they represented a reasonable and justifiable restriction on freedom of expression.
Compare this Canadian case with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1964), in which the Court reversed a criminal defamation
conviction and significantly limited the reach of criminal defamation statutes.
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In this respect, political discourse is of particular signifi-
cance.28
III. THE BALANCING ACT IN CANADIAN COMMON LAW
In matters between private parties, defamation law provides
two different schemes of liability depending on whether the offense
takes place in Quebec or in another Canadian province.  Indeed,
notwithstanding the British Conquest of 1760, the Province of Que-
bec retained its private law of French origin,29 codified for the first
time in 186630 and re-codified in 1994.31  Only Quebec’s public law
can trace its origins to British law.  In contrast, all the other Cana-
dian provinces are governed by the common-law system of British
origin, both as to public law and private law.  The reasoning in mat-
ters of civil liability as it relates to defamation differs significantly
within those two schemes.
Under Canadian common law, the falsity of defamatory state-
ments is presumed.  It is essentially a strict liability scheme: the
plaintiff does not have to establish that the defendant has perpe-
trated any wrongdoing.  The plaintiff must show that the statements
were objectively of such a nature as to disparage his or her reputa-
tion.32  A defamatory statement is one that would have the effect of
lowering esteem or respect for the person in the minds of people
described as “right-thinking members of society generally”33 or,
28. See Guignard, [2002] S.C.R. at 484 (stating that the right to counter-advertise
has important social implications and should be treated with the same deference as
certain types of political discourse); Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. at 727 (stating that political
expression is deserving of protection because of its important social implications).
29. An Act for Making More Effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of
Quebec in North America, 14 Geo. III, c. 83, section VIII (R.-U., 1774), available at http://
www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/PreConfederation/qa_1774.html.
30. Canadian Legal Information Institute, Quebec, http://www.canlii.org/qc/
index_en.html.
31. Id.
32. See PHILIP H. OSBORNE, LAW OF TORTS 372-74 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining that
the plaintiff must prove that 1) the defamatory statement may reasonably be under-
stood as referring to him; 2) it was published to a third person who heard it or read it
and understood it; and 3) the publication was intentional or due to a lack of care);
ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 683-94 (6th ed. 1997).
33. Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 2 All E.R. 1237, 1240 (H.L.). See Byrne v. Deane, (1937)
1 K.B. 818 (C.A.); Murphy v. La Marsh, [1970] W.W.R. 114.
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more recently, “reasonable or ordinary member[s] of the public.”34
If the statement is found to be defamatory, it is no excuse that the
defendant did not intend to defame the plaintiff or that reasonable
care was taken to ascertain its truth.35  Such evidence of the defama-
tory nature of the statement, on the balance of probabilities, gives
rise to a prima facie cause of action in defamation.
Once the cause of action for defamation has arisen, the defen-
dant may then raise defenses.  These defenses include the defense
of truth, absolute privilege, qualified privilege, and fair comment
on matters of public interest.  The defense of truth is established by
proving that the defamatory statement is indeed true. As Professor
Fleming writes, “At common law, truth is a complete answer to a
civil action for defamation and the only defence known generally
by the name of ‘justification.’  It is not that libel must be false but
that truth is in all circumstances an interest paramount to reputa-
tion.”36  The burden of proving the truth rests on the defendant.
In other words, the falsity is presumed in favor of the plaintiff.37
We will later see in this paper that casting the burden of truth on
the defendant may have the effect of inhibiting speech.
The defense of absolute privilege applies only to narrow cir-
cumstances.  Under this defense, defamatory statements are not ac-
tionable even if they are false and may even have been published
maliciously.  In cases where absolute privilege applies, “freedom of
speech prevails entirely over the protection of reputation.”38  In
general, absolute privilege is restricted to those situations in which
the privilege acts as an “aid to the efficient functioning of our gov-
ernmental institutions: legislative, executive, and judicial.”39  It cov-
ers judicial and parliamentary proceedings, and, to some degree,
executive communications.40
The defense of qualified privilege is a conditional immunity
which attaches to certain occasions generally defined by the correla-
tive concepts of duty and interest between the parties to the com-
34. Color Your World Corp. v. Canadian Broad. Corp., [1998] O.R.3d 97, 106.
35. OSBORNE, supra note 32, at 370. R
36. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 610 (9th ed. 1998).
37. LINDEN, supra note 32, at 698. R
38. LEWIS N. KLAR, TORT LAW 687 (3d ed. 2003).
39. FLEMING, supra note 36, at 615.
40. LINDEN, supra note 32, at 699-703. R
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR108.txt unknown Seq: 9 20-FEB-06 12:13
2005-2006] THE CANADIAN BALANCE 41
munication.  The defense applies “whenever a person who makes a
communication has an interest or a legal, social or moral duty, to
make it to another person who has a corresponding interest or duty
to receive it.”41  For example, this may be so in the case of elected
municipal officials and journalists.42  As Professor Osborne wrote,
“Ultimately, . . . the question is whether or not the interest in free
speech ought to be given priority over the interest in individual rep-
utation.”43  If the defendant is able to demonstrate that the criteria
for application of the defense of qualified privilege are met, it is
then incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish the bad faith or the
malicious intent of the defendant (by showing, for example, spite,
ill-will, or some indirect motive not connected with the privilege.)44
If there is no evidence of malice, the defendant is entitled to a
nonsuit.45
The last defense is the one of fair comment on matters of pub-
lic interest.  For Professor Osborne “it is the dominant concept in
restoring the balance between free speech and a free media on the
one hand and reputation on the other.”46  There are a number of
elements that the defendant must prove to win the protection of
this defense: the defamatory statement must be one of comment or
opinion based on facts (the defense does not extend to statements
of facts); it must be on a matter of public interest; and it must be
fair.  Matters of public interest fall within two main categories: “first,
those in which the public has a legitimate interest, such as govern-
ment activity, political debate, proposals by public figures, and pub-
lic affairs generally; and second, works of art displayed in public,
such as theatrical performances, music and literature.”47  To estab-
lish that the comment is a fair one, the defendant must show that
the facts upon which the comment rests are true and that the com-
41. Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. 663, 691 (citing Adam v. Ward,
[1917] A.C. 309, 334).
42. Id.
43. OSBORNE, supra note 32, at 378. R
44. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Dalrymple, [1965] S.C.R. 302, 309-10
(citing Jerome v. Anderson, [1964] S.C.R. 291, 299).
45. LINDEN, supra, note 32, at 712 (citing Dewe v. Waterbury, [1881] S.C.R. 143, R
155).
46. OSBORNE, supra note 32, at 380. R
47. LINDEN, supra, note 32, at 714. R
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ment “represents a legitimate opinion honestly held.”48  This de-
fense, contrary to that of qualified privilege, may be raised by any
person sued for defamation.  As with the defense of qualified privi-
lege, the defense of fair comment is lost if the plaintiff proves mal-
ice on the part of the defendant.
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the compli-
ance of the common law of defamation in light of the values guar-
anteed by the Canadian Charter in the case of Hill v. Church of
Scientology of Toronto.49  The Court’s legal reasoning did not involve
the application of the reasonableness test discussed in Part II be-
cause the matter at issue was not the constitutionality of a govern-
mental act as such, but rather the compliance of the common law
with Charter values.50  In such a case, the balancing of the conflict-
ing values must be more flexible.  The burden of proof lay in this
case entirely on the shoulders of the person challenging the consti-
tutionality of the common law. Plaintiffs were required to demon-
strate not only that the common law was repugnant to the values
protected by the Charter, but, further, that it could not be
justified.51
In Hill, the case involved allegations made during a press con-
ference by the attorney for the Church of Scientology against a
prosecutor in the Attorney General’s Office, to the effect that the
latter had misled a judge and had breached orders sealing certain
documents belonging to the Church.  Sued for defamation, the at-
torney and the Church of Scientology pleaded that the common
law of defamation unjustifiably infringed the right to freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Canadian Charter.  The question at
issue, therefore, was whether the common law struck the proper
balance between the values of freedom of expression and of good
repute.52  The defendants argued that the Court should strike the
balance in favor of free speech by adopting the actual malice stan-
48. Id. at 715.
49. [1995] S.C.R. 1130.
50. In Canada, although the common must be aligned with constitutional values,
the Constitution does not directly apply to the common law. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at
1132, 1155 (“Although the Charter does not directly apply to the common law, it must
be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with Charter principles.”).
51. Id. at 1171.
52. Id.
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dard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of New York
Times v. Sullivan.53
In this famous ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
common law of defamation infringed the right to freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution
when the information was broadcast by means of mass media.54
The common law of defamation prior to Sullivan drew presump-
tions of falsity and malice of the defendant from the evidence of
the defamatory nature of the statements.  According to the Court,
this strict liability scheme, in cases where the defamatory statements
were directed at public officials, could have a chilling effect on
truthful speech as well as false speech.55  Due to the fundamental
importance in a democratic society of the right of the citizens to be
able to freely express themselves and criticize the representatives of
the government, a plaintiff who is a “public official” must demon-
strate actual malice (sometimes referred to as constitutional mal-
ice); that is, the defamatory statement must be proved to have been
made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”56  Today, this burden of proof has been
extended to apply not only to public officials, but also to public
figures.57  In the case in which the plaintiff is a private person, how-
ever, the plaintiff need only demonstrate mere negligence, a far less
degree of fault.58  A finding of negligence is made when it is shown
that the defendant has failed to exercise ordinary or reasonable
53. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. Id.  Although a state statute was at issue in this case, that statute was derived
from the common law.
55. Id. at 279.
56. Id. at 280.
57. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (“We consider and would
hold that a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation appar-
ent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers.”).
58. See Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“We hold that, so
long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory false-
hood injurious to a private individual.”). See also JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS
LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 126-29 (3d ed. 2001); Joseph Kary,
The Constitutionalization of Quebec Libel Law, 1848-2004, 42 OSGOODE HALL L. REV. 229,
235 (2004) (stating that most state jurisdictions have adopted the negligence standard).
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care.  Under this standard, one must determine if he or she acted as
a reasonable person would have under the same circumstances,
rather than inquire into what the defendant knew or did not know
at the time of publication.59  In short, the determination of the ap-
plicable criteria relating to fault is based on the question of whether
the plaintiff is a public or private person. This distinction is appar-
ently based on the materiality of the expression in question (for
instance, a political message) and the influence of the persons de-
famed.60  In all instances, however, mere evidence of the falsehood
of the statements does not result automatically in the civil liability
of the defendant: a certain degree of fault must also be demon-
strated (actual malice or mere negligence).
In Hill, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the actual mal-
ice standard.61  The Court first noted the criticism of Sullivan by
American observers (such as the thorough investigation conducted
with respect to issues of media procedure, the increased costs of
litigation, the depreciation of the truth of public discourse, etc.)62
and stated that “the law of defamation is essentially aimed at the
prohibition of the publication of injurious false statements.”63
Once the defamatory nature of the statements has been established,
the defendant can rely on different defenses, notably the defense of
qualified privilege, fair comment, or in appropriate circumstances
the defense of truthfulness.  The Court concluded that the com-
mon law of defamation was in keeping with the values of the Char-
ter and it was therefore not necessary to amend it.64
IV. THE BALANCING ACT IN QUEBEC CIVIL LAW
In comparison with the Canadian common law of defamation,
the Quebec civil law favors free speech over reputation.  The Que-
bec Civil Code provides that “good faith is always presumed, unless
the law expressly requires that it be proved.”65  In civil matters, the
59. ZELEZNY, supra note 58, at 128-29.
60. Id. at 129.
61. Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1180-86.
62. Id. at 1182-85.
63. Id. at 1187.
64. Id. at 1188.
65. Civil Code of Québec, ch. 64 S.Q. § 2805 (1991).
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plaintiff is therefore required to establish that the defendant has
committed a fault.
The relationship between the Quebec Charter and the Civil
Code is hierarchical.  Section 52 of the Quebec Charter provides
that “no provision of any Act . . . may derogate from sections 1 to
38” of the Charter.  Consequent to section 52, the Quebec Charter
could render constitutionally void any section of the Civil Code
which is inconsistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed
therein.  The Supreme Court of Canada stated that the law of defa-
mation in Quebec was grounded in Quebec’s Charter as well as in
the Civil Code, and that the standard of care was one of fault,
rather than the strict liability standard of the Canadian common
law.66
The Quebec scheme of civil tort liability requires that the
plaintiff prove, according to the balance of probabilities, the exis-
tence of fault, prejudice, and a causal link between the fault and
the prejudice.67  In matters of liability for defamation, an assess-
ment of the fault and the prejudice must take into consideration
the contradictory values which, in this context, are freedom of ex-
pression (guaranteed by the Quebec Charter)68 and the right to the
protection of one’s reputation (guaranteed by the Charter and the
Civil Code).69
When a right guaranteed by the Quebec Charter is set up
against an Act of Parliament or of the Government of Quebec, the
two-step reasoning process described in Part II must be applied: the
alleged victim must demonstrate that the public act infringes on his
or her guaranteed rights, in which case the public actor must show
that this infringement is reasonable and justifiable in a free and
democratic society.70  In civil matters between private parties, the
plaintiff is similarly required to show an illegal or unjustified inter-
ference with his right, and that the interference was wrongful.  In
determining the wrongful nature of the interfering act, courts bal-
66. Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. at 688, 694-95, 698.
67. Civil Code of Québec, 1991 S.Q. ch. 64, § 1457; Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. at
683.
68. Quebec Charter, R.S.Q., ch. C-12, § 3 (2002).
69. Société Radio-Canada v. Radio Sept-Îles Inc., [1994] R.J.Q. 1811, 1818;
Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. at 686.
70. Quebec Charter, R.S.Q., ch. 1, § 9.1 (2002); Ford, [1988] S.C.R. at 769-70.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR108.txt unknown Seq: 14 20-FEB-06 12:13
46 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
ance the right to free speech with the right to safeguard one’s repu-
tation.  The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff, both with respect
to evidence of interference with his right and to the illegal or unjus-
tified nature thereof.71  In defamation proceedings, there will be an
unjustified, and therefore wrongful, interference with the right to
reputation of a person if the defendant did not act as a reasonable
person would have under the same circumstances.72
The assessment of fault in matters of defamation is a question
of the facts and circumstances viewed in the context in which it
arises.73  The following discussion illustrates the manner in which
the courts have balanced the right to freedom of expression against
that of protection of reputation under Quebec’s fault-based frame-
work of defamation law, in circumstances involving proceedings
against journalists, elected officials, and persons who do not dis-
charge any particular duties.
The role played by the media is of primary importance in a
democratic society.  The media, by collecting and broadcasting in-
formation, enable citizens to keep abreast of events and, as a result,
form enlightened opinions on matters of public interest.74  The
right of the public to be informed is included in the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression.75  The fact that freedom of the
press is of fundamental importance does not, however, mean that
the media are entitled to immunity from civil proceedings.76  Free-
dom of the press, like freedom of expression, may be restricted by
the need to protect the rights of third parties or legitimate public
interests, in particular the right to the protection of one’s
reputation.
In 1994, a case was brought before the Court of Appeal of Que-
bec dealing with an action in civil responsibility for defamation
71. JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN & PATRICE DESLAURIERS, LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 197-
05 (Yvon Blais ed., 2003).
72. Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. 663, 698; Société Radio-Canada, [1994] R.J.Q. at
1820. See Kary, supra, note 58, at 266-69. R
73. Néron Commc’n Mktg., Inc. v. Chambre des Notaires du Québec, [2004]
S.C.R. 95, 127-28.
74. Beaudoin v. La Presse Ltée, [1998] R.J.Q. 204, 212.
75. Aubry v. Vice-Versa, [1998] S.C.R. 591, 616; Canadian Broad. Corp., [1991]
S.C.R. at 475.
76. Beaudoin, [1994] R.J.Q. at 212. See NICOLE VALLIERES, LA PRESSE ET LA DIFFAMA-
TION 119 (1985).
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commenced by a radio station and one of its main shareholders
against a journalist and the television station of where she worked.77
In her televised news feature, the journalist had claimed that the
radio station was experiencing financial problems with the Quebec
Department of Revenue and also referred to the personal bank-
ruptcy of its main shareholder.  The shareholder and the radio sta-
tion initiated a defamation suit, alleging that the facts to which the
journalist referred were false and that no public interest whatsoever
was served by broadcasting them.78  With respect to the assessment
of fault, the court stated that the publishing or transmission of false
information will not always be wrongful and, conversely, that its ac-
curacy will not be automatically sufficient to discard any possibility
of civil responsibility.79  In the view of the court, the liability of a
media corporation and of a reporter was akin to professional liabil-
ity.80  Hence, in order to determine if the injury to the reputation
of a person is wrongful, one must compare the behavior with that
which a reasonable person working in the same field would have
exhibited.  The assessment of whether or not the behavior was
wrongful will be conducted in light of the professional standards
governing the activities of the media.81  In so doing, one must take
into consideration the realities and difficulties of the journalist’s
trade (in particular the space and time constraints).82  Therefore,
the fault does not arise from an obligation of result, but rather from
a duty of care or an obligation of means.83  The truth of the state-
ments and the notion of public interest are other factors that must
be taken into consideration in the assessment of fault in the field of
journalism.84
In this case, the court held that the preparation of the female
journalist had been “reasonably careful and conscientious,” and
that the information broadcast was “fundamentally accurate.”  Fur-
ther, in light of the economic significance the radio station repre-
77. Société Radio-Canada, [1994] R.J.Q. 1811.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1818-19.
80. Id. at 1820-21.
81. Id. at 1820.
82. Id.
83. Néron Commc’n Mktg., [2004] S.C.R. at 131-32.
84. Id. at 130-31.
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sented for the region, information relating to any financial
difficulties of the radio station was of public interest.85  The court
therefore dismissed the action for defamation.
Recently, in Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des
Notaires du Québec, the Supreme Court was called upon to render a
decision in a defamation suit involving the media.86  This decision
is of particular interest because, although the truth of the informa-
tion as well as the public interest in broadcasting had been estab-
lished, the Court nevertheless held the reporter liable for
defamation due to the journalist’s failure to observe the principles
of integrity and fairness in journalism.87
In a letter requesting a meeting with a journalist, a communi-
cations consultant working for the Chambre des Notaires du Québec88
notified the journalist of certain inaccuracies in her televised fea-
ture.89  The journalist contacted him and, during their conversa-
tion, the consultant indicated to the journalist that his letter was
not intended for publication.90  At the same time, the journalist
mentioned to the consultant that he himself had made two mis-
takes in his letter.91  The consultant replied that he would check
this information and that he would contact her within three days at
the latest.92  Without waiting for the three days to pass, the reporter
aired a new televised feature in which she only focused on the erro-
neous portions of the letter.93  The consultant sued the journalist
and the television station for damage to his reputation.94
The majority of the Justices of the Canadian Supreme Court
confirmed the state of the law to the effect that truth and public
interest were not the only criteria in assessing the wrongful nature
85. Société Radio-Canada, [1994] R.J.Q. at 1821-22.  For another application of the
same principles, see Beaudoin v. La Presse Ltée, [1998] R.J.Q. 204, 212.
86. Néron Commc’n Mktg., [2004] S.C.R. 95.
87. Id. at 101.
88. The Professional Association of Notaries in Quebec (translation provided by
author).
89. Néron Commc’n Mktg., [2004] S.C.R. at 102-04.
90. Id. at 104-05.
91. Id. at 105.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 105-07.
94. Id. at 108-09.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR108.txt unknown Seq: 17 20-FEB-06 12:13
2005-2006] THE CANADIAN BALANCE 49
of an injury to reputation.95  In the field of journalism, one must
also examine whether an individual adhered to professional stan-
dards of the reasonable journalist placed in the same circum-
stances.96  In this instance, the Court stated that the reporter, by
dealing in her second feature only with the inaccuracies contained
in the consultant’s letter, and by refusing to allow the consultant to
verify the accuracy of his allegations, had not followed the principle
of equity that applies in matters of journalism.97  The Court there-
fore allowed the action in civil liability for defamation.98
In another recent decision, Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, the Su-
preme Court was called upon to apply the notion of fault as part of
a defamation suit brought by citizens against an elected municipal
official.99  During a regular meeting of the municipal council, an
alderman publicly criticized a decision of the council not to appeal
a judicial decision voiding one of his bylaws, which provided that
only residents of a part of the city would have to cover the cost of a
loan to pay for the construction of a school.100  In his criticism, the
alderman made statements regarding two of the citizens who had
initiated the proceedings for repeal of the bylaw.101  He explained
that the two citizens had profited financially from the plan to build
the school.  These two citizens, claiming to have been injured by
this statement, sued the alderman for defamation.102
The Supreme Court first applied the general criterion in the
assessment of fault to the behavior of an elected municipal offi-
cial.103  Essentially, the alderman’s behavior was compared to that
of a reasonable person under the same circumstances: “[W]hile
elected municipal officials may be quite free to discuss matters of
public interest, they must act as a reasonable person would.  The
reasonableness of their conduct will often be demonstrated by their
good faith and the prior checking they did to satisfy themselves as
95. Id. at 130-31.
96. Id. at 131-32.
97. Id. at 137.
98. Id.
99. Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. 663.
100. Id. at 670-71.
101. Id. at 672.
102. Id. at 673.
103. Id. at 677.
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to the truth of their allegations.”104  The Court then pointed out
the futility of importing into the Quebec civil law of defamation the
defenses of qualified privilege and fair comment originating from
the common law.105  By taking into consideration the requirements
relating to the duties of a municipal official and the specific con-
straints arising from the administration of municipalities, the crite-
ria pertaining to the defenses of qualified privilege and fair
comment were already an integral part of Quebec civil law.106  The
Court held that the alderman had not committed a tort because he
“acted in good faith, with the aim of performing his duties as an
elected municipal official,” and because his statements were made
in the public interest.107  The Court also noted, at the very end of
its ruling, the dangers to the vitality of municipal democracy which
could have resulted from a conviction.108
In two recent judgments, the Appeal Court of Quebec was
called upon to balance the rights of freedom of expression and the
protection of one’s reputation in civil defamation suits brought by
elected officials.  In the first matter, two federal members of Parlia-
ment from Quebec brought proceedings against the Société Saint-
Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, an organization whose mission is to defend
the national interests of Quebec, in respect to statements made in a
letter published by a Quebec newspaper.109  In this letter, the Société
characterized the federal members of Parliament and ministers
from Quebec, including the plaintiffs, as “traitors” and “collabora-
tors” for voting in favor of the repatriation and amendment of the
Canadian Constitution without obtaining the prior consent of the
Province of Quebec through the Parliament.110  The court reversed
the decision rendered at trial by the Superior Court and dismissed
the suit.111 According to the majority of the judges, the statements,
albeit defamatory, were made in the public interest, in good faith,
and stated a reasonable opinion — namely, a point of view that is
104. Id. at 688.
105. Id. at 699.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 709.
108. Id.
109. Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal v. Hervieux-Payette, [2002] R.J.Q.
1669.
110. Id. at 1670-71.
111. Id. at 1683.
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reasonably arguable.112  The conduct of Société and the author of
the text could be equated with that of a reasonable person placed
in the same circumstances.113  The court stressed that the political
arena gives rise to the use of “strong and colorful vocabulary,” and
that elected officials, although they are entitled to protect their rep-
utations to the same extent as any other person, should expect to
be subjected to severe criticism by citizens.114
The Court of Appeal did not reach the same conclusion in the
defamation suit brought by Jacques Parizeau, then Chairman of the
Parti Québécois and Opposition Leader at the National Assembly
(Parliament of Quebec), and by Lucien Bouchard, then Federal
Member of Parliament from Quebec and leader of the Bloc
Québécois political party.115  A financial analyst who managed an
important investment advisory corporation compared the political
actions of the plaintiffs to those of Adolf Hitler in a monthly news-
letter of analysis.  The majority of the judges of the court, recalling
the teachings of the Canadian Supreme Court on the requirement
of Quebec civil law to focus the analysis of civil responsibility on the
notion of fault, held that the defendant had not acted as a reasona-
ble person would under the same circumstances.116  The defama-
tory statements, even though they dealt with matters of public
interest (the political situation in Quebec) and were made in good
faith, expressed opinions that were not reasonably arguable and
had not been subjected to any preliminary research or
verification.117
The difference in the results reached by the Court of Appeal in
these last two matters can be attributed to the contextual, case-by-
case analysis of the civil wrong.118  In the first matter, the defama-
tory statements were made within a particular political context in
relation to issues that, in Quebec, gave rise to very passionate and
hot debates.  Further, their dissemination was restricted to a Que-
bec audience.  In the second, the defamatory statements were not
112. Id. at 1674-75.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1676.
115. Lafferty, Harwood & Partners v. Parizeau, [2003] R.J.Q. 2758.
116. Id. at 2766.
117. Id. at 2768-69.
118. Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.R. at 686.
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made in such circumstances and, further, were aimed at an interna-
tional audience probably less capable of assessing the truth or false-
hood of the statements.  This latter case is presently on appeal
before the Supreme Court of Canada.119
V. COMPARISONS AMONG THE CANADIAN, QUEBEC, AND
AMERICAN LAWS OF DEFAMATION
A comparison among the laws of defamation in American law,
Canadian common law, and the Quebec civil law reveals some sig-
nificant differences with respect to the perception of the appropri-
ate balance between the rights of freedom of expression and the
protection of one’s reputation.  In general, one can argue that the
Canadian common law of defamation has tended to favor the pro-
tection of reputation at the expense of certain aspects of free
speech, and that the American and Quebec laws of defamation
have adopted a balance more favorable to freedom of expression.
This conclusion first follows from the difference in the standard of
liability that exists between them: the Canadian common law of def-
amation is governed by one of strict liability for falsehood, whereas
the American and Quebec laws of defamation are governed by prin-
ciples of negligence.
In the Canadian common law, the courts have chosen a low
threshold for the establishment by the plaintiff of a prima facie
cause of action in defamation,120 offering considerable protection
to his right to reputation. The balance in favor of free speech is
restored by a number of defenses, but the burden of proof rests on
the defendant.  In comparison, Quebec and American laws both
seem to show a certain bias towards freedom of expression and free-
dom of the press; the burden of proof of the wrongful nature of the
injury to reputation lies in both cases with the person defamed.
In the United States, the additional requirement of evidence of
a certain degree of fault to the criteria of defamatory nature and, in
some circumstances, the falsehood of the statements,121 results in a
119. Leave to appeal granted: No. 30103, (2004) Bull. of the S.C.C. 776.  Since
then, the parties have reached an out-of-court settlement.
120. OSBORNE, supra note 32, at 368. R
121. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that, when a newspaper published matters of public concern, a
private plaintiff cannot recover damages without proving that the statements are false:
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR108.txt unknown Seq: 21 20-FEB-06 12:13
2005-2006] THE CANADIAN BALANCE 53
heavier burden of proof resting on the shoulders of the defamed
American than that which is incumbent on the defamed Canadian.
The freedom of speech enjoyed by American citizens who use mass
media communications, particularly when they publish defamatory
statements regarding public officials and public figures, seems to
prevail over the right to the preservation of the reputation of the
latter.  The opposite appears to be true in Canadian common law,
wherein the plaintiff is not required to prove the wrongdoing of the
defendant for the latter to incur civil liability.  Note also that Cana-
dian law does not categorically change the threshold of proof de-
pending on the public or private status of the person defamed, as in
American defamation law.122
In Quebec civil law, the courts have rejected the strict liability
of common law defamation and instead have applied a standard of
care that is closer to the American negligence or actual malice stan-
dards.  In Quebec civil law, as in the United States, the falsehood of
defamatory statements does not necessarily give rise to the liability
of the author.  The inaccuracy or accuracy of the defamatory state-
ments only represents one of the factors considered in assessing
whether or not the conduct of the party sued is wrongful in nature,
regardless of whether the latter belongs to the world of journal-
ism.123  In this aspect, Quebec law is to be distinguished from Cana-
dian common law, which opts for a strict liability scheme in matters
of defamation.  It also differs from American common law, which
does not consider the issue of the truth or falsehood of the defama-
“The common law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a
plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.”  It is
also logically required that “the complained-of statements be allegations of facts, not
mere judgment or opinion that cannot be proven true or false.” ZELEZNY, supra note
58, at 113.
122. See Hill, [1995] S.C.R. at 1161 (“Reputation is an integral and fundamentally
important aspect of every individual.  It exists for everyone quite apart from
employment.”).
123. See Prudhomme, [2002] S.C.R. at 698, 703, 708-09 (stating that fault is deter-
mined according to what a reasonable person would have said in the circumstances; in
deciding what is reasonable, the court can also consider whether the individual acted
with malice, the degree to which the individual checked the facts before speaking, as
well as the nature of the forum, the time, and the opportunity the individual had to tell
the full story). See also Néron Commc’n Mktg., [2004] S.C.R. at 137 (stating that the no-
tion of public interest is another factor that must be taken into consideration in the
assessment of fault in the field of journalism).
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tory statements to be a factor in determining the existence of a
wrong, and applies two separate thresholds of proof depending on
the public or private status of the defamed person.  Despite these
differences, Quebec and American law both seem to show a certain
bias towards freedom of expression and freedom of the press: the
burden of proving the wrongful nature of the injury to reputation
lies in both cases with the defamed person.
At least in cases of political speech, the Canadian common law
of defamation should be modified because of the hidden chill that
it creates for the media.  As Professor Osborne has written, “[t]he
Canadian media is free to print or broadcast only the news it can
prove to be true.  This may lead to the suppression of matters of
public interest and other issues that ought to receive public scrutiny
and debate.”124  The American and the Quebec schemes of liability
further to a greater extent the value of speech in a democratic soci-
ety.  Aware that they will not be necessarily held civilly liable for the
dissemination of inaccurate defamatory statements, citizens and the
media are less inclined to self-censorship.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada took a further step
when it assimilated the liability of the media and journalists to one
of professionals.125  Hence, whether the information conveyed is
true or false, a natural person or a body corporate working in the
field of journalism is always required to discharge his duties in
keeping with the standards of the profession.  Some may argue that
this ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court could be difficult to
apply because of the great plurality of sources relating to journalis-
tic standards.126  This ruling, however, brings to light that the diffi-
cult task of acting as the watchdogs of democracy, which falls upon
journalists and the media, entails duties as well as rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Defamation law is constantly struggling to strike an acceptable
balance between freedom of expression and the protection of repu-
tation, both of which are important values in a democratic soci-
124. OSBORNE, supra, note 32, at 384-85. R
125. Néron Commc’n Mktg., [2004] S.C.R. at 97.
126. Louis-Philippe Gratton, Les Droits du Journaliste.  Et ses Devoirs? in DÉVELOPPE-
MENTS RÉCENTS EN DROIT DU DIVERTISSEMENT 97, 111-18 (Yvon Blais ed., 2000).
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ety.127  In Quebec and in the United States, the courts have tended
to stress the importance of free speech in a democratic society, per-
haps at the expense of some aspects of the right to protection of
reputation, particularly in the case of public figures in the Ameri-
can law of defamation.  In contrast, the interest of persons in pro-
tecting their good reputations was recognized early in the
development of the common law, and continues to receive strong
protection under the tort of defamation in Canada.  In recent
times, this has been called into question and it has been argued
that the balance drawn by the Canadian common law between the
competing values of individual reputation and free speech is in
need of some readjustment in favor of the latter.128  As we have
seen, to date there has been little change in conventional principles
regarding this balance in Canadian common law.
One cannot say that there is only one right balance that must
be reached in matters of defamation.  Because of the fundamental
importance of free speech and free press in democratic societies,
however, these values must be favored at least when political speech
is at stake.  The proper balance must also be established while keep-
ing in mind the tremendous influence and power the media have
in modern societies.
127. See generally Kary, supra note 58 (providing explanations for the differences
between the Canadian, American, and Quebec laws of defamation).
128. OSBORNE, supra note 32, at 368.
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